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Abstract (149 words) 
Ballot initiatives are consequential and common, with total spending on initiative campaigns in 
the US rivaling that of Presidential campaigns.  Observational studies using regression 
approaches on observational data have alternately found that initiative campaign spending cannot 
affect initiative outcomes, can increase the number of votes rejecting (but not approving) 
initiatives, or can affect outcomes in either direction. We report the first well-powered precinct-
randomized field experiment to evaluate an initiative advocacy campaign. We find that 
campaigns can influence both rejection and approval of initiatives by changing how citizens 
vote, as opposed to by influencing turnout or ballot completion.  Our experiment (involving 
around 18% of Oregon households in 2008) studied a statewide mail program conducted by a 
Political Action Committee.  Results further suggest that two initiatives would have passed if not 
for the advocacy campaign to reject them.  We discuss implications for theories about direct 
democracy, campaign finance, and campaign effects. 
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Ballot initiatives are a consequential, common, and costly aspect of American politics. This form 
of direct democracy can determine laws that have important economic and social consequences. 
Moreover, ballot initiatives may have implications for civic participation. Voters in states with 
ballot initiatives tend to be more engaged, exhibiting higher turnout (Tolbert and Smith 2005) 
and greater political awareness (Nicholson 2003).  Because the stakes can be high, substantial 
resources are often devoted to advocating for and against them, and total spending on initiative 
campaigns can rival that of Presidential campaigns (Gerber 1999; Initiative and Referendum 
Institute 2000).   
There is no clear consensus on whether ballot initiative campaigns affect initiative outcomes. 
Observational studies have come to a variety of conclusions while using regression frameworks 
that examine how money, interest group involvement, or advertising as independent variables 
affect initiative success as the dependent variable.  Some have concluded that initiative 
campaigns have no effect on initiative outcomes (Gerber 1999; Bowler and Donovan 1998), 
others suggest they do (Stratmann 2006; Smith 2004), and still others say that they are effective 
but only when advocating for rejection, not passage (Garrett and Gerber 2001; for a descriptive 
analysis see Broder 2000). Furthermore, this past research is unable to speak directly to whether 
ballot initiative campaigns influence outcomes by changing how citizens vote or by changing 
whether they vote. 
In this manuscript, we offer robust evidence that campaigns can have profound effects on 
initiative outcomes in either direction, by changing how citizens vote. To assess the causal 
impact of initiative advocacy, we report a well-powered precinct-randomized experiment 3 
 
conducted during a statewide ballot initiative campaign.  In addition to addressing questions 
about the impact of initiative campaigns, the research speaks to questions of campaign 
effectiveness, more generally (e.g., Gelman and King 1993; Holbrook 1996; Gerber 2004; 
Stratmann 2005). 
We worked with a Political Action Committee (PAC) that sought to sway the outcome of twelve 
ballot initiatives in the 2008 General Election in Oregon by sending one or two informative 
ballot guides to most households in the state. Out of twelve initiatives, the organization 
advocated for the passage of four and the rejection of eight. We find statistically and 
substantively significant effects on ten of the twelve initiatives. For two initiatives, it appears that 
effects were large enough to have altered the election outcome; the initiatives were rejected but 
would have passed were it not for the ballot guides.  
Interestingly, the treatment had no effect on overall turnout or on rates of ballot roll-off (i.e., 
failure to cast a vote on given initiative despite submitting a ballot). Taken together, the pattern 
of results suggests that the treatment affected vote margins by altering preferences among those 
who would have voted on the initiatives anyway, but in the other direction.   
This manuscript proceeds as follows. We begin with a review of past research on the effect of 
initiative campaigns. We then discuss the electoral context in which this study takes place and 
describe the advocacy program. We then discuss the precinct randomized design and the analysis 
plan of our field experiment involving 320,921 registered voters. Finally, we report the results of 
the experiment in terms of net vote margin, turnout, ballot roll-off, and effects on “up-ballot” 
political races. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research. 
PAST RESEARCH 4 
 
With little exception, research on ballot initiative campaigns has retrospectively analyzed 
existing datasets. Almost no research on this topic has used field experiments to identify causal 
effects, despite the emergence of field experiments in political science to study voter 
mobilization effects (Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber and Green 2004), and other campaign 
activities.
1  
One exception was Keane and Nickerson (2012). Using a precinct-randomized field experiment, 
they found that a coalition advocating for the rejection of five initiatives decreased support for all 
five initiatives, but they note several limitations. First, unlike the present study, their study was 
under powered.  Power was limited by the number of precincts in the study and the low rates of 
reaching targeted individuals in the canvass programs they studied. Second, whereas we 
disentangle the differential effects of persuasion from turnout and ballot roll-off, their lack of 
statistical power made such analyses impossible. Third, the advocacy campaign they study 
advocated for rejecting all initiatives. In the present study the political action committee we 
worked with advocated for passage of four initiatives and rejection of ten others, allowing us to 
                                                           
1 Research on the question of whether initiative campaigns matter could be viewed as a subset of 
work on the question of whether political campaigns matter, in general. Of course, this question 
has a long history, with some suggesting that campaigns can matter but only under some 
circumstances, and others arguing that campaigns have no effect (Jacobson 1978; Erikson and 
Palfrey 2000; Green and Krasno 1988). Recent evidence from randomized experiments suggests 
that campaigns can influence voter preferences (Gerber 2004; Arceneaux 2005), but possibly for 
only a fleeting period (Gerber, Green and Shaw 2011).  5 
 
address the question of whether campaigns for and against initiatives are similarly effective (e.g.. 
Broder 2000; Garrett and Gerber 2001).  
Studies using observational data and either regression frameworks or descriptive analyses have 
come to conflicting conclusions about the impact of initiative campaigns, offering three mutually 
exclusive claims about their impact. The first claim asserts that ballot initiative campaign 
spending has no effect on initiative outcomes. Gerber (1999), for example, argues that 
expenditures by organizations with minimal grassroots support relative to financial influence, 
called “economic groups”, have no effect on whether an initiative passes, and may even have a 
negative effect. Groups that have stronger grassroots support appear to have trivial effect as well, 
they report, though not quite as negative (see also Bowler and Donovan 1998; Garrett and Gerber 
2001). 
The second claim is that initiative campaigns can be potent when advocating for initiative 
rejection, but not passage. This is supported by studies showing that when one side has more 
money than the other, rejection efforts are more effective (Lowenstein 1982; Owens and Wade 
1986; Magleby 1984). Bowler and Donovan (1998) find similar results. After arguing that 
campaigns can affect initiative outcomes when opposing an initiative, they write “money spent 
by proponents in this arena is largely wasted” (as quoted in Strattman 2006, Bowler and 
Donovan 1998, p. 2).  
The third claim says that initiative spending is effective regardless of whether advocating or 
opposing an initiative. For example, Strattman (2006) reaches this conclusion using data on 
television advertising spending across several California media markets for initiatives from 2000 
to 2004.  Others make similar arguments, suggesting that interest group spending can influence 6 
 
both passage and rejection of ballot initiatives (Ellis 2002; Schrag 1998; Smith 1998; see also 
Broder 2000 for a descriptive journalistic discussion of this perspective). 
Our study yields results that are consistent with this last claim, finding that initiative spending, 
both for and against, has an effect on initiative outcomes. Further, we do not find an asymmetry 
in a campaign’s impact based on whether it advocates for or against an initiative.  Our findings 
are at odds with the claim that only campaigns advocating for passage of an initiative are 
effective and also at odds with the claim that initiative campaigns are ineffective, in general. 
Likewise, our results are at odds with the conclusion that groups without a widespread base of 
grassroots support, referred to as “economic groups,” have no effects on ballot campaigns 
(Gerber 1999). The organization behind the advocacy program reported in this manuscript is an 
economic group because it does not have a broad base of individual financial supporters.  In fact, 
it received 80% of its 2008 budget from 7 donors who each gave between $600,000 and 
$5,300,000 (Oregon Secretary of State).  
Our research also, practically, shows that direct mail communications from campaigns to voters 
can influence voter preferences. The present study examines the effect of one to two 
communications sent by mail. The result may be surprising in light of the dozens of randomized 
field experiments have shown that get-out-the-vote mail tends to have trivial effects on turnout 
(see Green and Gerber, 2008 for a meta-analysis of these studies).  Based on those findings, one 
might speculate that direct mail would have similarly small effects on vote choices. 
Moreover, the mail used in this experiment was informational and did not clearly leverage any of 
the psychological principles shown to motivate voter participation (see Rogers, Gerber and Fox 
2012).  Green and Gerber (2008) report a meta-analysis suggesting that mailers that do not 7 
 
leverage specific psychological insights generate a miniscule 0.3 percentage point increase in 
turnout.  A handful of studies have begun to address the question of how direct communications 
from campaigns to voters can affect voter preferences using regression discontinuity designs 
(Gerber, Kessler and Meredith 2011), precinct randomizations using a very small number of 
precincts (Gerber 2004; Keane and Nickerson 2012) and post-election surveys (Rogers and 
Nickerson 2012).  The present research goes beyond this literature by offering a precise and 
unbiased estimate of the effect of ballot guides sent from a campaign directly to voters on voters’ 
preferences across a diverse set of ballot initiatives. 
ELECTORAL CONTEXT 
This experiment was conducted during the 2008 General Election in the state of Oregon. There 
were twelve initiatives on the ballot. The exact text that appeared on the ballot is reprinted in 
Table 1. We collaborated with an advocacy organization that already planned to send ballot 
guides to voters.  This organization took a position on each initiative, though, as we discuss 
below, two of the initiatives (54 and 55) were uncontested and, therefore, deemphasized in the 
treatment materials.  
This election also included several high-profile races, including an election for US President and 
US Senate. In the Presidential race, Oregonians voted for Barack Obama over John McCain by 
more than a 16 percentage point margin.  This meant that not much presidential campaign 
expenditure occurred in the state, though there was substantial discussion and volunteer activity 
regarding that race.  The Senate race was expected to be one of the closest in the country and was 
also the target of substantial campaign expenditures.  According to Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) records, the Senate race in Oregon between incumbent Republican Gordon Smith and 8 
 
Democrat Jeff Merkley was the most expensive per capita in the country in 2008. The FEC 
reports that $20 million was spent by campaigns in Oregon for US Senate. An additional $10 
million was spent by campaigns in Oregon for US House, and $11 million by registered PAC’s 
in Oregon. FollowTheMoney.org documents that $54 million was spent by state-level candidates 
and initiatives. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Ballot Guides 
Defend Oregon targeted households in which one or more voters had a predicted probability of 
turnout greater than 0.3. Turnout probability was estimated based on a model score provided by 
the commercial firm Catalist, LLC. 78.4% of all 1.5 million households were targeted, or, 
equivalently, an estimated 85% of households with at least one registered voter.  
The advocacy organization mailed each targeted household at least one of five possible ballot 
guides (see Table 2 for distribution of how guides were targeted among treatment households).  
The guides can be divided into two categories, primary and secondary.  Primary guides were sent 
to most targets, while secondary were sent to a smaller subset mostly as a second guide.  The 
three types of primary guides were targeted to match the predicted ideology of the household as 
predicted based on data from the Catalist voter file (progressive, moderate or conservative).   
Among target households in treatment precincts, 13.8% were considered progressive and were 
sent a progressively framed ballot guide, which expressly mentioned the advocacy organization’s 
publicly recognizable progressive partners.  Households predicted to be politically moderate 
(51.0%) received a moderately framed ballot guide, which was designed to appear especially 
even-handed.  Households predicted to be conservative (31.4%) received a conservatively 9 
 
framed guide, which framed the issues in terms of government waste and taxation.  In total, 
96.2% of the households that were sent any ballot guide from the advocacy organization received 
one of these three primary guides. 
The other two types of ballot guides we refer to as secondary.  The first of these was an 
education-oriented guide sent in addition to a primary guide, which was sent to households 
believed to contain children.  The second of these guides targeted households headed by voters 
under 35 years old, many of which did not receive a primary guide.   Of all targeted households 
in treatment precincts, 71.7% received no secondary guide, 24.1% received the education guide 
in addition to a primary guide, and 4.1% received the young voter guide. 
The average number of ballot guides sent to a target household was 1.2.  A vast majority (97.0%) 
of the households that received more than one guide did so because they received the education-
oriented guide in addition to a primary guide.  In other words, households identified as having 
children make up nearly all of those who received more than one guide. A negligible amount of 
duplication occurred due to the vagaries of determining households based on imperfect address 
information and differences in the ways that households can be operationally defined based on 
this information. 
The five ballot guides advocated for positions on different subsets of the 12 ballot measures. In 
Table 1 we show which measures were addressed in each of the ballot guides.  
Randomization 
The smallest unit at which election outcomes are officially reported is the political precinct. An 
experimental design that randomizes at the level of the precinct has many strengths, not the least 10 
 
of which is that the dependent variable is an official observed outcome that is free of sampling 
error and errors of self-report (see Keane and Nickerson, 2012; Gerber 2004; Arceneaux 2005).  
We randomly assigned precincts to treatment or control before any treatments were administered 
using simple random assignment.  Voters residing in precincts assigned to treatment were sent 
ballot guides based on the above criteria. Given the advocacy organization’s needs, the total 
number of voters in our untreated control condition was limited to about 5% of the Oregon 
electorate. Given this constraint, we restricted the experimental universe to only the moderately- 
and small-sized precincts.  This approach maximized the total number of precincts in our study 
for a fixed number of voters in the control, thus improving statistical power.
2  
Seven hundred Oregon precincts were selected for inclusion in the study, 500 of which were 
assigned to treatment and 200 of which were assigned to control. Post-election, four of these 700 
precincts (one control precinct and three treatment precincts, 0.6% of the initial 700) could not 
be matched to reported election returns. The total number of voters in the study was 320,921, of 
which 91,540 were in the control group. According to the Oregon Secretary of State our 
experimental universe included approximately 18% of the Oregon electorate. 
Dependent Variables 
Our analysis examines four dependent variables. All are reported on public records of precinct-
level results made available by the Oregon Secretary of State. First, we estimate the net change 
                                                           
2 We also pruned the universe before random assignment to eliminate precincts for which the 
reported number of registered voters varied by more than 20% between two different sources of 
registered voters per precinct. 11 
 
in vote margin for each ballot initiative due to treatment. This is our central outcome of interest 
because the ballot guides focused on supporting or opposing the initiatives. Second, we estimate 
the net change in voter turnout due to the treatment. Turnout could be affected if the treatment 
motivated citizens to cast a ballot, or, alternatively, discouraged citizens from voting. Third, we 
estimate the net change in the number of voters who “roll-off” or abstain from voting on the 
ballot measures, even though they cast a ballot to vote on other items. Voters may roll-off if they 
are uninformed about the initiatives. Because the treatment provided information and 
recommendations, voters who received the guides may have felt more informed and therefore 
willing to vote on the measures.  Fourth, and finally, we consider whether treatment altered 
support for up-ballot candidates.  
Estimation 
Our analysis uses regression to estimate the average change in precinct-level vote margin due to 
treatment. Precinct-level vote margin is defined as the number of citizens voting for a ballot 
measure minus the number of citizens voting against that ballot measure, divided by the total 
number of ballots cast in the precinct.  A vote margin between 0 and 1 indicates a majority voted 
for the measure and margin between 0 and -1 indicates a majority voted against. 
Vote margin is regressed on the treatment indicator and, in the covariate adjusted version of this 
estimator, a measure of Democratic voting rates in the precinct based on past vote history. The 
model without covariates, model 1, can be written 
(1)            =   +      +   , 
where    is vote margin,    is the treatment indicator, and    is an error term. The subscript j 
indexes over precincts. The model with covariates, model 2, can be written   12 
 
(2)           =   +      +      +      +   , 
where    is a predictor of Democratic voting rates in the district (also in percentage terms)
3, and 
   indicates a missing value of   .  
We estimate the models using ordinary least squares regression. Since    may be homoscedastic 
due to differing precinct sizes we use “robust” standard errors, though this does not affect the 
findings. 
Collapsing the data at the precinct level is the customary approach to analyzing data of this sort. 
Some might object that the procedure is not consistent for estimating the average effects of the 
treatment at the level of the individual voter (see Middleton 2008; Middleton and Aronow 2011). 
These results are robust when using an unbiased, nonparametric, equally efficient estimator that 
is consistent for average individual-level effects.
4 
RESULTS 
                                                           
3 The Democratic Performance Index (DPI) is a synthetic variable created by the National Center 
for an Effective Congress, designed to be broadly predictive of Democratic voting across 
political races. The index is designed to help political organizations make operational decisions 
about voter outreach campaigns. We use it as a covariate to improve the efficiency of our 
estimator, but give no causal interpretation to its coefficient. Since we use the DPI created before 
the 2008 election for use by political organizations during the 2008 campaign, we need not worry 
that this covariate is partially determined by the treatment and, hence, correlated with the 
treatment indicator. 
4 Interested readers should follow up with the authors. 13 
 
This section presents the estimates for the effect of the treatment on ballot measure support, 
turnout, roll-off and candidate support. 
Ballot Measure Vote Margin 
Table 3 shows that the treatment had sizable effects on vote margin for ten of the twelve ballot 
initiatives (56-64) in the intended directions. Among the ten, effects on vote margin ranged from 
2.5 percentage points to 6 percentage points. It is notable that the treatment affected ten different 
electoral outcomes, not just one.  
There were two initiatives unaffected by the treatment (54 and 55). Two unusual features of 
these initiatives may explain the lack of impact on their election outcomes. First, as described 
above, the advocacy organization sent treatment households up to two out of five ballot guides. 
Only one of the five ballot guides made reference to Initiatives 54 or 55 while each of the other 
ten were referred to in multiple guides; only 20% of targeted households received a ballot guide 
that referred to either of these two initiatives.  Second, these two initiatives were unique in that 
they were essentially uncontested in terms of campaign activity and had lopsided vote margins, 
passing statewide with a 41.0% and 48.9% vote margin, respectively (i.e., 70.5% and 74.4% of 
votes cast for each initiative were cast in favor of the initiatives).  This suggests that the vote 
margin may have reached a ceiling. 
As discussed above, some research suggests that advocacy campaigns are ineffective, in 
particular when: a. the advocating organization is an economic group with few grassroots 
members (Gerber 1999); or b. the advocating group is advocating for passage of an initiative 
(Broder 2000; Garrett and Gerber 2001).  We note that the advocacy organization that sent these 14 
 
mailings qualifies as an economic group, and that Table 3 shows that they significantly and 
substantively increased support for passing Initiatives 56 and 57.  
Finally, Table 3 shows that the treatment effect for Initiatives 61 and 64 was greater than the 
statewide vote margin for the initiatives. Put differently, Initiative 61 (about mandatory drug 
sentencing) was defeated by 2.2 percentage points statewide, and the treatment decreased support 
for it in our experiment universe by about 5 or 6 percentage points in the average precinct; 
Initiative 64 (about how political funds can be spent) was defeated by 1.0 percentage point 
statewide, and the treatment decreased support for it in our experimental universe by about 5 or 6 
percentage points in the average precinct.  If we assume that the treatment effect in our 
experimental universe generalizes to the larger Oregon precincts that were excluded from this 
study (but in which the advocacy organization conducted the exact same program), then we can 
say that if not for the advocacy campaign the electoral outcomes of these two initiatives would 
have been otherwise.
5 Even if the average effect outside the experimental universe were a 
fraction of these estimates, the election outcomes would still be attributable to the campaign.  
Ballot Roll-off Rates 
                                                           
5 We cannot prove, statistically, that the treatment effect in our experimental universe would 
generalize to the large precincts outside of our experiment universe. That said, we find no 
relationship in our experimental universe between precinct size and treatment effect. This 
suggests that the advocacy organization’s treatment may have resulted in similar average 
treatment effects in Oregon’s large precincts as we found in our experiment universe of small- 
and moderately-sized precincts.  15 
 
Table 4 reports how treatment affected the rates of ballot “roll-off” for each of the initiatives. A 
voter exhibits roll-off when s/he votes in high profile races, such as President or US Senate, but 
fails to vote on lower salience items such as ballot initiatives.  We calculate roll-off for a given 
precinct by subtracting the total number of votes cast for a given initiative from the total number 
of votes cast for the race with the greatest number of total votes cast (which was always the 
Presidential election).  Results suggest that roll-off was not affected for eleven out of twelve 
initiatives, suggesting that the mailings did not have a substantive effect on increasing ballot 
completion.  
For Initiative 65 there is some evidence that roll-off was reduced. We do not interpret this as 
particularly meaningful given the relatively small effect size, the lack of effects on the other 
initiatives, and a nonsignificant result in the nonparametric analysis (available upon request). 
Moreover, given the sheer number of statistical tests being conducted as part of this project, we 
might expect to see one or two coefficients achieving statistical significance just by chance. 
Turnout 
Table 5 shows the treatment had no meaningful effect on turnout. A body of work on the impact 
of ballot initiatives on the electorate suggests that the presence of initiatives increases turnout, in 
general (Tolbert, Grummel, and Smith 2001), or in Midterm elections but not Presidential 
elections (Smith, 2001). The absence of a turnout effect in the present experiment only 
tangentially speaks to that work. This is because both lines of that research suggest that the 
increases in turnout come from the introduction of a ballot initiative into an election (and the 
ensuing initiative campaign), while the current study focuses on changing voters’ preferences on 
ballot initiatives that had already been introduced into the election in that state. Whatever turnout 16 
 
affect arises from the introduction of a given initiative in a state should already have been 
incorporated into voters’ likelihoods of voting before our treatment was administered.  
The fact that our treatment did not affect voter turnout suggests that people do not fail to vote 
because they are uninformed since our treatments were informative about the ballot initiatives. 
Since the results are reported at the cluster level (the precincts) one might suggest that the 
treatment results are averages that mask an increase in turnout among some voters (e.g., 
Democrats), and a decrease in turnout in equal measure among others (e.g., Republicans).  We 
examined the individual-level voter file data to look for evidence of heterogeneous treatment 
effects.  We found no significant interactions between treatment assignment and the 
demographic attributes on file: gender, party registration or age.   
Effects on Candidate Races 
Table 6 presents the results for candidate races. Results are mixed, with estimates suggesting that 
treatment may have increased votes for the Democratic Senatorial, House, and State Senate 
candidates. However, the covariate adjusted estimates are greatly diminished, and the results are 
not replicated using a nonparametric estimation approach, available upon request.  Because of 
this lack of robustness, the results do not support an interpretation that ballot guides affected up-
ballot races.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We present the first well-powered cluster-randomized field experiment showing that an 
independent organization advocating for and against a suite of ballot initiatives can have a 
consequential and significant effect on initiative outcomes. This contrasts with findings 
suggesting that campaigns do not have an effect on initiative outcomes (Gerber 1999; Bowler 17 
 
and Donovan 1998) and work suggesting that only campaigns against initiatives are effective 
(Broder 2000; Garrett and Gerber 2001). We find that the campaign’s impact on win margin for 
these initiatives did not influence turnout or roll-off. This pattern of results suggests that the 
campaign affected vote margin by altering ballot preferences among those who would have cast 
their vote on the initiatives anyway, but in the opposite direction.  
To calculate cost per additional vote added to vote margin we use the following equation: 
    (A * B) / (C * D) 
The variable A is the treatment cost per targeted household.  Targeted households received an 
average of 1.2 mailings, so if we assume each mailing cost $0.75, then it cost $.90 per targeted 
household.   The variable B is the proportion of all households containing a registered voter in 
the experiment universe that were targeted.  As reported above, 85% of households in the 
experiment universe with at least one registered voter were targeted.  The variable C is the 
average impact on vote margin for each of the twelve advocated for initiatives.  Using the 
covariate adjusted estimates from Table 3 the average impact on each initiative’s vote margin is 
3.5 percentage points.  The variable D is the number of initiatives for which the treatment 
advocated.  There were twelve initiatives advocated for by this treatment.  Calculated this way, 
the treatment yielded an additional vote in the vote margin in the favored direction for each 
initiative at $1.84.   
This is a low cost. For example, get-out-the-vote efforts involving two pieces of standard mail 
that do not reflect recent innovations from psychological insights costs around $400 to $500 per 
increased voter (see Green and Gerber 2008). Cost effectiveness is not as well studied for 
persuasive mail communications. Another persuasion campaign conducted in 2008 in Oregon 18 
 
(Rogers and Nickerson 2012) targeted self-identified pro-choice voters and tried to correct the 
misinformation that the incumbent Senator was pro-life and not pro-choice (he was actually pro-
choice).  That campaign found that it cost $40 per additional vote added to the voter margin in 
the favored direction. 
Why might the cost per net vote for each initiative have been low in this election? We speculate 
that voters may be especially receptive to the style of the treatment studied: factual, seemingly 
objective, and, for four out of five versions, ostensibly non-political summaries of multiple ballot 
initiatives. One might still find the effect magnitudes surprising in light of the hotly contested 
political context in Oregon in 2008. However, inundated with political communications for a 
variety of contests, recipients may have responded positively to the systematic and clear vote 
recommendations provided in a compact format. Indeed, theories of bounded attention (Gabaix, 
Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg 2003) suggest that in noisy election environments voters may 
place a premium on these kinds of efficient communications – so long as they are perceived to be 
credible.  Future research should assess whether this kind of treatment is, in fact, especially 
effective in hotly contested elections as opposed to less cluttered election environments.  
Another reason for the ballot guide effectiveness may be that they were delivered directly to 
voters’ homes, since all ballots are cast by mail in Oregon.  This all vote-by-mail election may 
have created the conditions whereby voters may have completed their ballots at home with the 
ballot guide present to inform their decisions. Future research should explore whether vote-by-
mail moderates the effectiveness of persuasive ballot guides.  This might be testable by studying 
ballot guide effectiveness in precincts with total populations that are just above and below the 
number where vote-by-mail becomes mandatory (see Meredith and Malhotra 2008). 19 
 
We report inconsistent results on the impact of the ballot guides on up-ballot candidate support.  
The results are not robust enough to take seriously, but they are provocative.  Support for up-
ballot candidates could be altered if treatments that affect preferences on ballot measures also 
prime issues or preferences that change the way the candidate choice is construed (Iyengar and 
Kinder, 1987; Krosnick and Kinder, 1990).  If replicated more robustly a finding like this would 
suggest that influencing voter preferences for down-ballot initiatives may affect preferences for 
up-ballot contests like US Senate and US Congress.  We hope future research explores this 
possibility. 
Finally, the organization that conducted this mail program was financially supported by a small 
group of donors.  Therefore, our findings are inconsistent with work suggesting that 
organizations without broad financial support of grassroots donors, so-called economic 
organizations, have trivial effects on initiative outcomes (Gerber 1999). That economic 
organizations can influence initiative outcomes has normative implications, particularly because 
ballot initiatives are often described as giving the people, not interest groups, direct democratic 
power to decide important policy issues. As such, our findings may provide fodder for those who 
wish to regulate campaign funding.20 
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Table 1: Ballot Measures, Defend Oregon’s Positions and Electoral Outcomes 
Measure  Description as Printed on Ballot 
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Yes votes  No votes  Result 
54  Amends Constitution: Standardizes voting eligibility for school 
board elections with other state and local elections. 
Pro  X          1,194,173  450,979  Pass 
55  Amends Constitution: Changes operative date of redistricting 
plans; allows affected legislators to finish term in original district. 
Pro  X          1,251,478  364,993  Pass 
56  Amends Constitution: Provides that May and November property 
tax elections are decided by majority of voters voting. 
Pro  X  X  X  X  X  959,118  735,500  Pass 
57  Increases sentences for drug trafficking, theft against elderly and 
specified repeat property and identity theft crimes; requires 
addiction treatment for certain offenders. 
Pro  X  X  X    X  1,058,955  665,942  Pass 
58  Prohibits teaching public school student in language other than 
English for more than two years 
Anti  X  X  X  X  X  756,903  977,696  Fail 
59  Creates an unlimited deduction for federal income taxes on 
individual taxpayers’ Oregon income-tax returns 
Anti  X  X  X  X  X  615,894  1,084,422  Fail 
60  Teacher “classroom performance,” not seniority, determines pay 
raises; “most qualified” teachers retained, regardless of seniority 
Anti  X  X    X  X  673,296  1,070,682  Fail 
61  Creates mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain theft, 
identity theft, forgery, drug, and burglary crimes 
Anti  X  X  X    X  848,901  887,165  Fail 
62  Amends Constitution: Allocates 15% of lottery proceeds to public 
safety fund for crime prevention, investigation, prosecution 
Anti  X  X  X  X  X  674,428  1,035,756  Fail 
63  Exempts specified property owners from building permit 
requirements for improvements valued at/under 35,000 dollars 
Anti  X  X  X    X  784,376  928,721  Fail 
64  Penalizes person, entity for using funds collected with “public 
resource” (defined) for “political purpose” (defined) 
Anti  X  X    X  X  835,563  854,327  Fail 
65  Changes general election nomination processes for major/minor 
party, independent candidates for most partisan offices 
Anti    X  X      553,640  1,070,580  Fail 26 
 
 
Table 2: Relative Frequencies of Combinations of Primary and Secondary Guides   
 
  Secondary Guides 
      No secondary guide  Education  Young voter  Both     Total 
                   
P
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
G
u
i
d
e
s
 
  Progressive    10.4%  3.3% 
a  a 
 
13.8% 
  Moderate    35.3%  15.4% 
a  a 
 
51.0% 
  Conservative    25.9%  5.2% 
a  a 
 
31.4% 
  No primary guide 
  a  a  3.6% 
a 
 
3.8% 
  More than one 
  a  a  a  a 
 
a 
 
   
             
   
Total    71.7%  24.1%  4.1% 
a 
 
100.0% 
                   
 
 
     
 
           
a Fewer than 0.3% of targeted households were sent this combination of guides. 
Note: Percentages represent relative frequencies of guide combinations over all targeted households in experimental precincts. 
Percentages lower than 0.3% are omitted from the table for clarity but are included in the marginal percentages. In total only 0.9% of 
households fell in to omitted cells. 
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Table 3: Estimated Effects on Ballot Measure Vote Margin 
   
 
collapsed data reg. 
Actual 
Statewide 
Measure  Position      (1)    (2)  Vote Margin 
54  Pro    0.8     
(1.3) 
0.6     
(1.2) 
41.0% 
55  Pro    -0.4     
(1.2) 
-0.4    
(1.2) 
48.9% 
56  Pro    4.2*** 
(1.5) 
3.3*** 
(1.2) 
12.3% 
57  Pro    4.6*** 
(1.2) 
4.2*** 
(1.2) 
21.7% 
           
58  Anti    -5.9*** 
(1.8) 
-4.9*** 
(1.3) 
-12.2% 
59  Anti    -4.9*** 
(1.5) 
-4.2*** 
(1.3) 
-25.9% 
60  Anti    -4.1*** 
(1.5) 
-3.3*** 
(1.2) 
-21.9% 
 61†  Anti    -6.0*** 
(1.7) 
-5.0*** 
(1.4) 
 -2.1%† 
62  Anti    -6.0*** 
(1.5) 
-5.1*** 
(1.4) 
-19.9% 
63  Anti    -3.6* 
(2.3) 
-2.5* 
(1.8) 
-8.0% 
 64†  Anti    -5.9*** 
(1.6) 
-5.1*** 
(1.3) 
 - 1.0%† 
65  Anti    -4.1*** 
(1.0) 
-4.5*** 
(1.0) 
-28.5% 
 
    * p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01 
Note: Results presented in percentage points.  Estimates represent the number of citizens voting 
for a ballot measure in a precinct minus the number of citizens voting against that ballot measure 
in the precinct, divided by the total number of ballots cast in the precinct; † signifies estimated 
treatment effect greater than the statewide vote margin for the initiative. If the results generalize 
to all treatment recipients, not just those recipients in the study, then we would conclude that the 
initiative failed as a result of the advocacy organization’s effort. 
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Table 4: Estimated Effects on Ballot Roll-off Rates  
   
collapsed data reg. 
Measure  Position  (1)  (2) 
54  Pro  0.4     
(0.3) 
0.3      
(0.3) 
55  Pro  0.3     
(0.4) 
0.1      
(0.4) 
56  Pro  -0.2    
(0.4) 
-0.4      
(0.4) 
57  Pro  -0.1    
(0.3) 
-0.2      
(0.3) 
       
58  Anti  0.0     
(0.2) 
0.0      
(0.2) 
59  Anti  0.1     
(0.3) 
-0.1      
(0.3) 
60  Anti  0.4     
(0.4) 
0.4      
(0.4) 
61  Anti  0.2      
(0.4) 
0.1      
(0.4) 
62  Anti  -0.1      
(0.3) 
-0.3      
(0.3) 
63  Anti  0.3      
(0.3) 
0.1      
(0.3) 
64  Anti  0.2      
(0.3) 
0.1      
(0.3) 
65  Anti  -0.7** 
(0.4) 
-0.9*** 
(0.3) 
 
    * p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01  (one-tailed) 
Note: Results presented in percentage points.  Estimates represent the total number of votes cast 
for the race with the greatest number of total votes cast (which was always the Presidential 
election) minus the total number of votes cast for a given initiative in a precinct minus.   
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Table 5: Estimated Effects on Turnout 
 
collapsed data reg. 
 
(1)  (2) 
Turnout 
0.3 
(0.4) 
0.3 
(0.4) 
 
    * p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01   (one-tailed) 
Note: Results presented in percentage points.  Estimates represent the total number of ballots cast 
in the treatment precincts minus the total number of ballots cast in control precincts.   
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Table 6: Estimated Effects on Candidate Races 
   
collapsed data reg. 
number of 
precincts  
Race  (1)  (2) 
696  President  1.8     
(2.6) 
0.2     
(1.5) 
696  Senate  4.2** 
(2.5) 
2.8** 
(1.4) 
512  House  9.4** 
(4.8) 
3.1     
(3.5) 
696  Secretary 
of State 
2.2     
(2.3) 
0.5     
(1.4) 
696  State 
Treasurer 
2.2     
(2.1) 
1.0     
(1.3) 
216  State 
Senate 
6.4*   
(4.5) 
1.0     
(3.1) 
464  State 
House 
1.0     
(3.3) 
-0.1    
(2.4) 
 
    * p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01  (one-tailed) 
Note: Results presented in percentage points.  Estimates represent the total number of votes cast 
in the treatment precincts for the Democratic candidate minus the total number of votes cast in 
control precincts for the Republican candidate.   